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IN DEFENSE OF RATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT
Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Freier
Strategic Studies Institute

Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.” 1 Risk accompanies
both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always
or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the
current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key
objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the
cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. 2
Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military
decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is
absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed.
From the beginning, Iraq was an experiment in risk taking. To be sure, the war’s
advocates saw it as risk mitigation as well—remember ‘smoking guns’ and ‘mushroom
clouds,’ for example. However, at its core, toppling Saddam was about balancing the
certainty of violent dislocation that accompanies overthrow of an unfavorable but stable
status quo against the hope for a more favorable, future post-war political order. It was
extension of “the democratic peace” by force—whether or not the forcible export of
representative governance was ever a formal casus belli. In this context, Iraq engendered
enormous risk from the beginning. There was the ever-present ‘likelihood of failure or
prohibitive cost’ that needed to be accounted for in deliberate planning.
For example, there were obvious dormant sectarian divisions. Given Saddam’s
violent separation of ruler from ruled, this indicated the distinct possibility of
uncontrolled civil conflict in the aftermath of the government’s collapse. There was the
extant Iraqi overdependence on primary resource exports for government revenues.
This, in the developing world (which Iraq rejoined from below in 2003), commonly
signals persistent danger to political order. There was a certainty that at least two of
Iraq’s neighbors would actively resist through politics, influence, and at times,
violence—American success. Still others would be very sympathetic to Iraq’s minority
Sunni; if not quite hostile to Shi’a or Kurdish triumph. Others still—likely most—would
remain reticent on the issue of Iraq’s democratic success or failure. Finally, there was
the precedent of the Soviet Afghan War. In Afghanistan (circa 1979-89), external
intervention was a magnet for Muslim anti-colonial resistance. Tribalism, nationalism,
and Muslim extremism combined to militate against Soviet success. These same forces
join today with internecine sectarianism to similarly check American progress in Iraq.
Rational risk assessment in advance of the Iraq intervention would have identified
and accounted for all of these. Each, after all—individually or in combination, could be
enough to seriously delay favorable outcomes, prevent success, or drive strategic costs
to prohibitive levels. Evaluating each seriously, thoughtfully considering their
implications, and accounting for them deliberately in strategy development is a sign of

wisdom, not fear. Instead, those engineering the Iraq War framed strategic risk
incorrectly. They assumed ultimate success—a stable, representative, multifaith
polity—would rapidly and naturally occur as a result of the necessary but decidedly
intermediate step of overthrowing the existing regime. Thus, in their view, the
likelihood for some near-term “harm or loss” was insignificant compared to the
anticipated return on the nation’s strategic investment. Their risk calculations simply
never went beyond D-Day.
It is now well-documented that Iraq policy was made in a strategic vacuum. It
appears no vizier-like or mandarin-like class on the inside carefully weighed specific
grand strategic options vis-à-vis the United States, Iraq, and the world in detail,
calculating different choices and their inherent risks and benefits. There were prescient
warnings. It is now clear few were heeded. In short, the risk problem, as it was likely
presented to the President, was a strawman. It failed to account comprehensively for
the real hazards engendered in deliberate regime destruction, stabilization, and
reconstruction in a large, consequential state. Iraq proceeded from risk assessment that
in its sophistication went little beyond “nothing ventured nothing gained.”
This is a caution for the future. Risk-informed strategy does not indicate risk
aversion. Identifying risks and hazards and accounting for their mitigation does not
prevent action. Rather, it underwrites success. The bold too often mistake thoughtful
consideration of real hazard for weakness. Quite the contrary, deliberate consideration
of risk-adjusted choices increases the prospect for bold action’s ultimate success. Riskinformed strategy provides decisionmakers with a realistic accounting of strategic
conditions as they are, versus as some would prefer them to be. It proceeds from the
conclusion that raw capacity and desire alone do not determine success. It recognizes
that our perceptions of our motives and intentions are likely quite different from the
perceptions of others. Finally, it demands that strategists account for both the prospect
of failure and the progressive accumulation of excessive cost that—without
mitigation—might jeopardize long-term success and the security of interests of equal or
greater importance.
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